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THE EVER-EXPANDING COMPLETE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE AND
THE COPYRIGHT ACT: Is THIS WHAT CONGRESS REALLY
WANTED?

Elizabeth Helmer'
This comment explores the ways in which the doctrines of
preemption, and more recently, complete preemption are being
applied to the Copyright Act. In deciding whether claims are
preempted by the Copyright Act, courts apply the "Extra Element
Test. " However, courts are increasingly applying this test by
looking at the facts underlying the claim, rather than the elements
needed to prove the claim, and preempting more readily. Once
satisfied that the claim is preempted, some courts are allowing
complete preemption to take hold, and removing the claim to
federal court. Courts have traditionallytried to determine whether
Congress intended to allow removal, since Congressionalintent is
the touchstone of removal jurisdiction. However, in light of the
Supreme Court's decision in Beneficial National Bank v.
Anderson, some courts have departed with the Congressional
intent requirement, holding that by wholly displacing an area of
law, Congress intended to create complete preemption. This lax
application of the complete preemption doctrine has led to
unexplainable results, undermines Congressional intent to
preserve various state law claims, and threatens to erode long
standingjurisdictionalprinciples.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Under the long established "well pleaded complaint" rule, a
cause of action arises under federal law only when the face of the

1 J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, (2007).
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complaint raises a federal issue.2 A complaint presents a federal
question by invoking federal law as the basis for relief It does not
suffice that the facts alleged in support of an asserted state-law
claim would also support a federal claim. Thus the plaintiff, as
"master of the complaint,"5 can craft a cause of action as arising
under state rather than federal law and "a defendant cannot remove
on the basis of a federal question even if the plaintiff could have
asserted a federal claim."6 As this pertains to cases falling within
the scope of the Copyright Act, the "well pleaded complaint"
doctrine suggests that by bringing a cause of action under state
law, rather than the Copyright Act,7 the plaintiff can effectively
avoid federal question jurisdiction.8
Although the well pleaded complaint requirement continues to
apply in most cases, in limited circumstances it has been
supplanted by the doctrine of "complete preemption." Complete
preemption is distinct from the doctrine of ordinary preemption
2

Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987) (citing Gully v. First

Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936); Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211
U.S. 149 (1908)).
3 Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 12 (2003) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
4Id.
5 The master of the complaint doctrine was first announced by Justice Holmes
in 1913: "Of course the party who brings a suit is master to decide what law he
will rely upon and therefore does determine whether he will bring a 'suit arising
under' the. .. law of the United States." The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co.,
228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913).
6 Freeman v. Bechtel, 936 F. Supp. 320, 324 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (citing
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)).
7 Federal law governs when a plaintiff pleads a cause of action arising under
the Copyright Act, pursuant to § 1338 (a) of Title 28 of the United States Code.
8 Christopher Blackford, Attention Shoppers: The Federal Circuit's Failure
To Preempt Contractual Provisions Prohibiting Reverse Engineering May
Create A Blue Light Special On JurisdictionalForums, 57 SMU L. REv. 63, 79
(2004); see Caterpillar,482 U.S. at 392; Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. at 25
(1913) ("Of course, the party who brings a suit is master to decide what law he
will rely upon.") (Holmes, J.); see also Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson,
478 U.S. 804, n.6 (1986) ("Jurisdiction may not be sustained on a theory that the
plaintiff has not advanced."); Great North R. Co. v. Alexander, 246 U.S. 276,
282 (1918) ("[T]he plaintiff may by the allegations of his complaint determine
the status with respect to removability of a case.").
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and has significant differences in terms of removal jurisdiction.
Ordinarily, preemption is raised as a defense and does not serve as
a basis for removal because the plaintiffs claims do not raise any
federal issue and do not satisfy the "well pleaded complaint" rule.
Rather, if the court finds that the plaintiffs state law claim is
preempted by federal law, the claim is simply dismissed.9 A claim
may be preempted expressly or impliedly. Express preemption
occurs when Congress authorizes preemption within the statute
itself."° Implied preemption applies in situations where Congress
has expressed intent to entirely occupy a field of legislation.
Preemption has long-been held to apply to claims falling within
the scope and general subject matter of the Copyright Act." In
other words, when a claim is brought in state court that involves an
original work of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of
expression, and the right asserted is equivalent to one of the rights
protected by federal copyright law, the claim is preempted and
consequently dismissed.'"
"Complete preemption," on the other hand, is a term used to
define those situations in which preemption does provide a basis
for removal. The complete preemption doctrine, which has been
invoked in an ever-increasing number of cases and contexts, holds
that narrow classes of claims are so "necessarily federal" that they
will always permit removal to federal court, even if a federal issue
is not raised on the face of the complaint. 3 Thus, if a plaintiff files
suit in state court based upon a state cause of action, and the
defendant removes the case on the basis of a valid complete
preemption defense, the federal district court will re-characterize
9 14B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 3D § 3722.1 (3d ed. 1998

and Supp. 2005) (discussing the difference in ordinary and complete
preemption) (hereinafter "WRIGHT").
10 By saying, for example, "we hereby preempt."
" See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT,
§ 1.01 [B] at 1-10 (2004) (hereinafter "NIMMER").
12 Id. See discussion of test infra pp. 11-13.
13 WRIGHT, supra note 9; see Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers
Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1983) (Brennan, J., explaining
Supreme Court's decision in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Ass'n of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 390 U.S. 557 (1968)).
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the plaintiffs claim as arising under federal law, making removal
proper on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. 4 In this way,
the complete preemption doctrine overrides longstanding values of
federalism as well as important limiting doctrines of federal
subject matter jurisdiction, such as the "well pleaded complaint"
rule and the principle that the plaintiff is master of the complaint. 5
Since the emergence of the complete preemption doctrine, the
Supreme Court has held that complete preemption applies in three
types of cases: those that fall under the scope of the Labor and
Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 6 the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act ("ERISA"),"7 and most recently, the National
Bank Act ("NBA"). 8 The Supreme Court has not, however,
addressed complete preemption under the Copyright Act. As a
result, lower courts have been forced to grapple with the doctrine,
fashioning various tests in an attempt to identify when, if ever, it
would apply to the Act. 9
This Comment will argue that in light of evolving legal
methodologies, the once narrow doctrine of complete preemption
is being applied more liberally, and in effect, denying plaintiffs the
long-held freedom to act as the master of the complaint in deciding
See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2000) (governing removal and stating that "any
civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a
claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States
shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties").
15 See WRIGHT, supra note 9; Tristin K. Green, Complete Preemption14

Removing the Mysteryfrom Removal, 86 CAL. L. REV. 363, 371 (1998).
16 See generally Avco Corp., 390 U.S. 557 (1968) (holding that a state-court
lawsuit to enjoin a defendant union from striking actually arose under § 301 of
the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA") and allowing removal).
Although the Avco Court did not mention artful pleading, preemption, or even
the well-pleaded complaint rule, Avco is known for promulgating these doctrines
based on the Court's later characterization of the case in FranchiseTax Board v.
ConstructionLaborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1983).
17 See generally Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987) (holding
that Congress intended to allow removal of claims that fell within the scope of
ERISA).
18 See generally Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (2003)
(holding that Usury claims against a nationally chartered bank are preempted by
the National Bank Act).
19 WRIGHT, supra note 9.
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whether to bring a cause of action under state or federal law. Part I
explores the differences in the doctrines of ordinary and complete
preemption. Since the Supreme Court has not expressly ruled on
complete preemption under the Copyright Act, lower courts have
struggled with a number of tests that often hinged on whether
Congress intended not only to preempt claims under the Act, but
more specifically, allow for complete preemption and removal.20
Part II outlines the test lower courts have applied to determine
whether a claim is preempted and expresses dissatisfaction with
their application of the "extra element" test.2'
Rather than
comparing the elements needed to prove a state law claim with the
elements needed to prove a Copyright claim, courts are
scrutinizing claims to determine whether the facts giving rise to a
state claim could theoretically give rise to a Copyright claim and
then allowing preemption to take hold.
Part III argues that the Supreme Court's ruling in Beneficial
NationalBank v. Anderson22 virtually eliminates the need to delve
into Congressional intent before applying complete preemption,
suggesting that by wholly displacing an area of law, Congress
intended to allow removal. This more lenient standard essentially
blurs the justifications that once separated ordinary and complete
preemption doctrines. Complete preemption historically required a
more explicit finding of Congressional intent because it represents
a more drastic deviation from well-settled jurisdictional principles
and should therefore be applied sparingly.23

20

See Blab T.V. of Mobile, Inc. v. Comcast Cable Commc'ns, Inc., 182 F.3d

851, 856-57 (11th Cir. 1999) (describing the myriad of tests used by other

Circuits).
21 The "extra element" test is supposed to ensure that rights and
remedies that
are different in nature from the rights comprised in a copyright and that may
continue to be protected under State common law or statute. For example, a
claim of fraud should remain unaffected because it included the additional
element, breach of confidentiality. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 132 (1976).

539 U.S. 1 (2003).
Another reason suggested for the Supreme Court's reluctance to extend the
doctrine is its potential to expand the courts' federal question jurisdiction, a
move that would increase the federal courts' already burdened caseload.
WRIGHT, supra note 9, at § 3522.2.
22
23

N.C.J. L. & TECH.
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Part IV attempts to distinguish the Copyright Act from other
statutes which the Supreme Court has held warrant complete
preemption. Because the Copyright Act was drafted after the
emergence of the doctrine of complete preemption, courts should
continue to defer to Congressional intent, and find that Congress
did not intend to allow for removal of claims under the Copyright
Act.
Part V argues that the increasingly lax application of the
complete preemption doctrine leads to unexplainable results,
undermines Congressional intent to preserve various state law
claims, and threatens to erode long-standing jurisdictional
doctrines such as the "well pleaded complaint rule."
This Comment concludes by summarizing the developments
that have led to the expansion of the complete preemption doctrine
and emphasizes the need to use a more rigorous standard that will
ensure that our jurisdictional values are not ultimately eclipsed by
it.
II. ORDINARY PREEMPTION UNDER THE COPYRIGHT ACT
Although ordinary preemption does not confer subject matter
jurisdiction on a federal court, finding that ordinary preemption
applies is a necessary predicate to the doctrine of complete
preemption. In essence, complete preemption requires a more
explicit finding of Congressional intent to control an area of the
law than ordinary preemption. Therefore, lower courts must find
that ordinary preemption applies before considering whether
"Congress desired to control the adjudication of the federal cause
of action to such an extent" that it not only provided preemption as
a defense, but "replaced the state law with federal law and made it
clear that the defendant has the ability to seek adjudication of the
federal claim in a federal forum."24
Ordinary preemption applies to claims that fall under the
Copyright Act. However, determining whether a claim actually
falls under the Copyright Act is a task that has caused confusion
24 WRIGHT, supra note
9.
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among lower courts. Most courts apply a two part test: (1) the
work must fall under the subject matter of copyright as an original
work of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression
(subject matter prong); and (2) the right asserted must be
equivalent to one of the rights protected by federal copyright law
(general scope prong).2 5 Consequently, in a situation where the
rights asserted under state or common law are not equivalent to a
right protected under federal copyright law, ordinary preemption
will not take hold.
A. Subject Matter Prong
The "subject matter" prong requires that the particular work to
which the claim is being applied falls within the type of works
protected by the Copyright Act under 17 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103.
Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with § 102:
in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship include the
following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works;
(7) sound recordings; and
(8) architectural works.
A work need not consist entirely of copyrightable material in order to
meet the subject matter requirement, but instead26need only fit into one
of the copyrightable categories in a broad sense.

25
26

See NIMMER, supra note 11.
See Nat'l Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 848-50 (2d Cir.

1997) (holding that preemption under § 301 bars state law misappropriation
claims with respect to "uncopyrightable as well as copyrightable" elements of
televised basketball game).
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B. General Scope Prong
Second, the "general scope" prong requires finding that the
state claim seeks to vindicate rights equivalent to one of the
exclusive rights protected by copyright law under 17 U.S.C.
§ 106.27 Under 17 U.S.C. § 106, the owner of a copyrighted or
derivative work has the exclusive rights to: reproduce the work,
prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work,
distribute the work to the public, perform the work publicly,
display the work publicly, and perform the work publicly by means
of a digital audio transmission.
A right granted by state law is regarded as equivalent when it
provides an infringement action for the acts of "reproduction,
adaptation, performance, and display, as set forth in § 106. "28 On
the other hand, a state claim is not preempted if it consists of "extra
elements" that make it qualitatively different from a copyright
infringement claim. 29 The Fourth Circuit has described the widely
used "extra element" test in the following manner:
[W]hen a state law violation is predicated upon an act incorporating
elements beyond mere reproduction or the like, the rights involved are
not equivalent and preemption will not occur. To avoid preemption, a
cause of action defined by state law must incorporate elements beyond
those necessary to prove copyright infringement, and must regulate
conduct qualitatively different from the conduct governed by federal
copyright law.30
This test is reinforced by 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(3), which
admonishes, "[n]othing in this title annuls or limits any rights or
remedies under the common law or statutes of any State with
respect to ... activities violating legal or equitable rights that are

27

Rosciszewski v. Arete Assocs., 1 F.3d 225, 229 (4th Cir. 1994); Briarpatch

Ltd.,
2 8 L.P. v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 305 (2nd Cir. 2004).
MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDNG COPYRIGHT LAW § 11.7 (3rd. ed.

1999).
29 See Ritchie v. Williams, 395 F.3d 283, 286 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that most
circuits use the "extra element" test).
30 Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d 655, 660 (4th Cir. 1993)
(holding that to prove misappropriation of a trade secret, plaintiff was required
to prove elements beyond those required in a copyright infringement claim).
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not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general
scope of copyright as specified by section 106 .... "31
Though the "extra element" test appears to provide somewhat
of a safeguard against complete preemption, it has failed to provide
any real guidance to the courts.32 One commentator lamented:
There is always some difference between the state law and the
Copyright Act, so a court that wants to avoid preemption can always
find some difference, however small, that is the "extra element" needed
to avoid preemption. The net result is that courts seem to first decide
independently whether or not they think preemption should apply, and
then label the result accordingly ....
Thus, the "extra element" test has
proved 33circular in practice, and the cases are ad hoc, inconsistent, or
wrong.

A review of recent court decisions, however, reveals that many
courts are applying the "extra element" test in a manner that
focuses more on the facts used to plead a claim, rather than the
elements needed to prove a claim. This probing application of the
test, perhaps more accurately called the "Let's Get to the Bottom
of this Complaint Test," lends itself to supporting complete
preemption under the Copyright Act.
34 the
For example, in Briarpatch Ltd. v. Phoenix Pictures,

plaintiff brought an action for unjust enrichment. The basic
elements for unjust enrichment in New York require proof that: (1)
the defendant was enriched; (2) at the plaintiffs expense; and (3)
31 17 U.S.C. § 30 1(b) (2000). "The evolving common law rights of 'privacy,'

'publicity,' and trade secrets, and the general laws of defamation and fraud,
would remain unaffected as long as the causes of action contain elements, such
as an invasion of personal rights or a breach of trust or confidentiality, that are
different in kind from copyright infringement." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 132
(1976).
32 See Schuyler Moore, Straightening Out Copyright Preemption, 9 UCLA
ENT. L. REv. 201, 204 (2002). One commentator complained that it "simply
states a conclusion. When is a right provided by state law qualitatively different,
and how different in nature must it be to escape preemption? In all but the
simplest cases, the 'extra element' test cannot be applied with any certainty."
MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 11.7[C] (3d ed.
1999).
33 Moore, supra note 32 at 204.
34 See Briarpatch Ltd., L.P. v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296 (2d Cir.
2004).
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equity and good conscience militate against permitting defendant
to retain what the plaintiff is seeking to recover.35 In contrast,
under copyright infringement, "a plaintiff must show that: (1) it
owned a valid copyright; and (2) the defendant copied original
elements of its copyrighted work."36 The different elements that
make up the two claims are readily apparent. However, moving
beyond the traditional confines of the "extra element" test, the
court found that the plaintiffs' unjust enrichment claim was the
equivalent of a copyright infringement claim,37 and therefore
completely preempted. The court went on to hold that "while
enrichment is not required for copyright infringement, we do not
believe that it goes far enough to make the unjust enrichment claim
qualitatively different from a copyright infringement claim."38
The Sixth Circuit recently endorsed an even more far-reaching
approach, seemingly
abandoning the "extra element" test
altogether, in favor of what they perceive to be a national interest
in ensuring unity under the Copyright Act.39 In Ritchie v.
Williams,4" the defendant (Williams) brought counterclaims against
the plaintiff (Kid Rock) for breach of contract, unjust enrichment,
misrepresentation, conversion, and injunctive relief against further
misappropriation of income derived from Kid Rock's songs.
Despite explicit Congressional intent to preserve breach of contract
claims,4 as well as a myriad of other claims involving an extra
element, the Sixth Circuit held that both the contract42 and tort
35
36

Id. at 306 (citing Clark v. Daby, 751 N.Y.S. 2d 622, 623 (2002)).
Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d 655, 660 (4th Cir. 1993)

(citing Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991)).
37 The court found that the plaintiff was essentially claiming the defendant had
adapted a novel, copyrighted property, into a film without authorization.
Briarpatch,373 F.3d at 306.
38 See id. at 305.
39 See generally Ritchie v. Williams, 395 F.3d 283 (6th Cir. 2005).
40
1 d. at 288.
41 "Nothing in the bill derogates from the rights of parties to contract with
each other and to sue for breaches of contract . . . ." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at
132 (1976).
42 Arguably, claims based on contract should never be preempted,
since the
rights arise under the contract, not state law, so preemption cannot logically
apply. Moore, supra note 32. However, some courts have found that the
contract itself or even a promise within the contract provide the extra element
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claims were subject to complete preemption under the Copyright
Act:
The parties agree.., that these various 1989 alleged agreements were
designed to control the ownership, performance rights and exploitation
of copyrights on songs written by Kid Rock, including the
performance, recording and distribution of those songs. The Williams
group alleges that Kid Rock performed these songs and transferred to
other parties the right to publish, record and distribute them, thereby
breaching his contracts with Williams, the Michigan production
company, the recording company and the publishing company.43

In applying the "extra element" test, the court acknowledged
that despite the presence of extra elements, if such elements were
"merely illusory," then the claim was equivalent to a copyright
action." The court focused on the facts underlying the claim rather
than the elements needed to prove it. It found that all of the
contractual and tort claims were "equivalent" to infringement
claims and lacked a "meaningful 'extra element' needed to
"remove the reformulated claims from the policy of national
uniformity established by the preemption provisions of § 301
(a)." 45 To use Judge Friendly's phrase, they are "infused with...
national interests," because the various publishing and

that would foreclose preemption. See, e.g., Nat'l Car Rental Sys., Inc. v.
Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 431 (8th Cir. 1993) ("We conclude
that the alleged contractual restriction on National's use of the licensed programs
constitutes an extra element in addition to the copyrighted rights making this
cause of action qualitatively different from an action for copyright."); Dorsey v.
Money Mack Music, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 2d 858, 865 (E.D. La. 2003) ("The
existence of a promise ...renders plaintiffs claims qualitatively different from a
copyright infringement claim, and thus cannot be preempted."); see also Mark
A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property
Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REv. 111, 143 (1999) ("Courts considering . .
preemption of contract terms have reached different results in different cases. A
number of courts have preempted contracts under both patent law and copyright
law. Other courts have refused to preempt contract terms asserted to be at odds
with the copyright or patent statutes.").
43
Ritchie, 395 F.3d at 288.
44 See id.; see also Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc., 320 F.3d 1317,
1324 (Fed Cir. 2003) ("Claims might be preempted whose extra elements are
illusory....").
45

Ritchie, 395 F.3d at 288.
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performance rights of Kid Rock's songs should be the same in
Michigan as they are in New York and other states.46
Following this lax application of the "extra element" test, the
court went on to consider whether it should dismiss the claims, as
typically done pursuant to preemption, or recharacterize the claims
as arising under the Copyright Act and remove the case to federal
court. The Sixth Circuit, addressing complete preemption under
the Copyright Act for the first time, concluded that Congress had
47
indicated that "complete preemption is necessary in this field.
Once the court was satisfied that all claims had been completely
preempted, warranting their recharacterization as copyright claims,
the claims were dropped because the statute of limitations had run
under the Copyright Act. Hence, the plaintiff was left without a
valid complaint and no legal recourse.48 This ironic result
exemplifies the manner in which the application of the complete
preemption doctrine undermines the principle that plaintiff is
master of his complaint.
Imagine the following hypothetical scenario, as laid out by one
commentator:
An enthusiastic film producer has a great idea for a film that she has
never written down, and she tells this great idea to a studio executive
over lunch. The studio executive then goes back to his office and writes
a script based on the idea and proceeds to make a film based on the
script. The producer then brings a state law claim, alleging
misappropriation, conversion, unjust enrichment, fraud, and other nasty
things. Putting aside the question of whether or not the producer should
ultimately win the case, the producer should not be prohibited from
bringing the state law claim on the basis of copyright preemption,
because the producer does not own any exclusive rights to the tangible
work (i.e., either the script written by the studio executive or the film
produced by the studio).49

Unfortunately, under current case law, whether the plaintiff is
the owner of any exclusive rights to the tangible work in question
46

Id.(internal citation omitted).

47 d.
48

As Nimmer puts it, the alternative approach (allowing infringement claims

even though a free-standing ownership claim would be time-barred) leads to
results that are "potentially bizarre." NIMMER, supranote 11.
49 MOORE, supra note 32.
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is irrelevant. Once again, the plaintiffs state claims would be
subject to preemption under the Copyright Act, leaving potential
for those claims to be dropped altogether, despite the inequitable
result." This is precisely what happened in Dielsi v. Falk.5 The
plaintiff, in Dielsi, a speech coach asserted that he wrote a
potential script for "Columbo" entitled "Never Trust a Gambler."
He submitted the script to the show's producer, though it was
never accepted or rejected. The plaintiff alleged that his script was
later used as the basis for an episode of "Columbo" entitled
"Strange Bedfellows. '5 2 The plaintiffs suit alleged a number of
wrongs, including conversion and negligence. A California district
court found that the plaintiff's claims of conversion and negligence
were completely preempted by the Copyright Act, warranting
removal to federal court." Upon removal, however, the defendants
pointed out that the copyright claim was procedurally defective.
Though the work fell within copyright protection because it was an
"original [work] of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of
expression," it was not registered, and "no action for infringement
of the copyright in any work shall be instituted until registration of
the copyright claim has been made in accordance with [the
copyright laws]." 54 Therefore, the claims were dropped, leaving
the plaintiff without remedy.
These decisions indicate a growing willingness by the lower
courts to allow preemption, and more specifically, complete
preemption, even when doing so would leave the plaintiff without
a remedy. Rather than looking for extra elements that should
prevent preemption, courts are actually asking whether the claim is
grounded on facts that could have, in theory, been the basis for a
55
claim under the Copyright Act.
Alternatively, the court could find that the claim was not preempted because
this work of authorship was not fixed in any tangible medium of expression, and
was therefore not within the subject matter protected by the Copyright Act.
51 See Dielsi v. Falk, 916 F. Supp. 985, 994 (C.D. Cal.
1996).
50

52

53
54

1d. at 987.

Id. at 993.
id.

Theoretically, in Ritchie, the plaintiff could have brought an action under
the Copyright Act if the statute of limitations had not run. Similarly, in Dielsi v.
55

218
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III. DETERMINING WHETHER COMPLETE PREEMPTION APPLIES
A. Looking at CongressionalIntent

Though courts agree that preemption applies to claims arising
under the Copyright Act, the issue of complete preemption remains
unsettled. Once satisfied that a claim is preempted by the
Copyright Act, courts, until recently, attempted to determine
whether removal on the basis of § 301(a) of the 1976 Copyright
Act (complete preemption) was proper. Mindful of separation of
powers and federalism concerns, courts typically declined to allow
removal absent Congressional intent to provide an exclusive
federal cause of action.5 6 Courts examined the substance and
language of the federal statute, as well as the legislative history.57
In essence, a complete preemption analysis focused on evaluating
Congressional intent, the "touchstone" of federal court removal
jurisdiction.58
The statutory basis for preemption, § 301(a) of the Copyright
Act, provides:
On or after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright as specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are
fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject
matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, whether
created before or after that date and whether published or unpublished,
are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled
to any such right or equivalent right in any work under the common law
or statutes of any State.59

Falk, the plaintiff could have brought an action under the Copyright Act if she
had registered her work.
56 Arthur R. Miller, Artful Pleading: A Doctrine in Search of Definition, 76
TEX. L. Rv. 1781, 1800 (1998).
57 In Avco and Metropolitan Life, the statutory language provided an express
federal remedy for the plaintiffs' claims. In addition, the legislative history
"unambiguously described an intent to treat such actions as arising under the
laws of the United States." See Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1
(2003) (describing Avco and MetropolitanLife).
58 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66 (1987).
51 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
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In Rosciszewski v. Arete Associates, a Fourth Circuit panel was
among the first to extend the complete preemption doctrine to
§ 301(a) of the Copyright Act.6 ° Reaching this decision, the panel
focused on Congressional intent, particularly the legislative
history, stating that "section 301 is intended to be stated in the
clearest and most unequivocal language possible, so as to foreclose
any conceivable misinterpretation of its unqualified intention that
Congress shall act preemptively."'" Although Congress did not use
language in the Copyright Act similar to that found in the Labor
and Management Relations Act ("LMRA") or Employee
Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") to demonstrate its
intent to allow removal,62 the panel nonetheless concluded that the
broad preemptive force of § 301(a), in combination with the grant
of exclusive federal court jurisdiction for actions arising under the
Copyright Act, "compel[led] the conclusion that Congress intended
that state-law actions preempted by § 301(a) of the Copyright Act
arise under federal law."63 In other words, since Congress intended
that such claims "arise under federal law," the court allowed the
claims to be recharacterized as federal claims, making removal
proper. Many district courts have found Rosciszewski to be
particularly instructive and deferred to its finding that
Congressional intent compels complete preemption under the
Copyright Act.' However, the issue has been directly addressed
by few circuit courts and is far from settled.65
1 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 1994).
Rosciszewski v. Arete Assocs., 1 F.3d 225, 232 (4th Cir. 1994) (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 9401476, at 130 (1976)), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5746).
62 ERISA explicitly provides for removal to federal
court. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441 (a).
63 Rosciszewski, I F.3d at 232.
64 Numerous district courts in California and elsewhere have concurred with
the Roscizewski analysis. See, e.g., Metrano v. Fox Broad., Co., Inc., 2000 WL
979664, at 3 (C.D. Cal.) ("Accordingly, state claims that are equivalent to
federal copyright claims are completely preempted by the Copyright Act.");
Info. Handing Servs., Inc. v. LRP Publ'ns, Inc., 2000 WL 433998, at 4 (E.D.
Pa.) ("Finally, other courts that have considered the issue have found the
Copyright Act to be completely preemptive."); Worth v. Universal Pictures,
Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 816, 821 (C.D. Cal. 1997) ("Complete preemption has been
found for claims brought under the Copyright Act."); Dielsi v. Falk, 916 F.
60
61
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B. Expanding
Complete Preemption: Beneficial National Bank v.
an
Anderson
The Supreme Court has long-held affirmative evidence of
congressional intent to be "the touchstone of the federal district
court's removal jurisdiction."" v Therefore, prior to the Supreme
Court's 2003 holding in Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson,
lower courts would not apply complete preemption without
addressing: (1) whether ordinary preemption applied; and (2)
whether Congress intended to allow removal based on complete
preemption.6 8
In light of the Supreme Court's 2003 decision in Beneficial,
however, such a foray into Congressional intent to allow complete
preemption is apparently unnecessary. In Beneficial, the Supreme
Court held that because §§ 85 and 86 of the National Bank Act69
Supp. 985, 993 (C.D. Cal. 1996) ( "Although there is no Ninth Circuit authority
on point, a common law claim preempted by federal copyright law is clearly
completely preempted under these principles.") (emphasis in original); Wharton
v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 144, 146 (D. Md. 1995)
(following Rosciszewski); Patrick v. Francis, 887 F. Supp. 481, 485 (W.D.N.Y.
1995) (following Rosciszewski).
65 In Ritchie v. Williams, the Sixth Circuit, holding that complete preemption
did apply to the Copyright Act, noted that only the Second and Fourth Circuits
had directly addressed the issue and decided in favor or complete preemption.
66 See Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1 (2003).
67 See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66 (1977).
68For
example, the Fourth Circuit examines whether: (1) the rights underlying
the state cause of action are equivalent to the exclusive rights granted under a
federal statute; and (2) the statutory language and legislative history evinces
Congress' intent that litigation to protect the federal rights occur in federal
courts. The Tenth Circuit adopted a similar test, examining whether: (1)
Congress has provided a federal cause of action to enforce the federal law, thus
revealing congressional intent to allow removal in such cases; and (2) the state
claim is displaced by federal law under an ordinary preemption analysis. The
Fifth Circuit uses a three-part test, requiring: (1) the existence of a federal cause
of action within the federal statute; (2) a provision conferring jurisdiction to the
federal courts for the cause of action that "closely parallels" the jurisdictional
provisions of the LMRA and ERISA; and (3) evidence of "the kind of
congressional intent found to exist with respect to ERISA." See Blab T.V. of
Mobile, Inc. v. Comcast Cable Commc'ns, Inc., 182 F.3d 851, 856-57 (11th Cir.
1999).
69 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2000).
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provided an exclusive federal remedy for state law claims against
nationally chartered banks, there was "no such thing as a state-law
claim of usury against a national bank."7° The Court did not
require that Congress provide an express statement indicating its
intent to completely preempt an area of law, instead finding that by
wholly displacing an area of law, Congress intended to create
complete preemption.7'
Thus, rather than searching for explicit Congressional intent to
permit removal, as had previously been the case, Beneficial
suggests that courts are merely required to determine whether the
federal statute preempts state law because Congress has provided
an exclusive federal remedy, thereby creating an exclusive federal
cause of action.72 This more lenient standard for finding complete
preemption is akin to the criteria that had previously been used to
find implied ordinary preemption, a defense that did not allow
removal. A number of lower courts have used Beneficial's logic as
a platform to extend the doctrine of complete preemption to other
areas of the law, such as the Copyright Act. This was precisely the
approach taken by the Second Circuit's recent decision in
BriarpatchLtd., L.P. v. Phoenix Pictures,Inc.7 3
In Briarpatch, the court held that the plaintiffs unjust
enrichment claim was completely preempted by the Copyright Act,
and allowed removal, despite the plaintiffs adamant protests that
he did not seek relief under the Copyright Act. Discussing
complete preemption in light of Beneficial, the Second Circuit
concluded that the Supreme Court had intended to extend complete
preemption to any federal statute that creates an exclusive federal
cause of action.74 "The Copyright Act does just that. Like the
National Bank Act in Beneficial, the Copyright Act lays out the
70
71
72

539 U.S. at 11.
d"

See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL

SYSTEM 22 (5th ed. Supp. 2003) (reaching the same conclusion).
7' 373 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 2004).
74 "Until the Supreme Court's recent

decision in [Beneficial National Bank v.
Anderson] we would have hesitated to extend the complete preemption doctrine
into the copyright field." Briarpatch Ltd., L.P. v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373
F.3d 296, 304 (2d Cir. 2004).
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elements, statute of limitations, and remedies for copyright
infringement.75 It therefore follows that the district courts have
jurisdiction over state law claims preempted by the Copyright
76
Act.
While Briarpatch was not the first case to apply complete
preemption under the Copyright Act, it was the first to find that
complete preemption unequivocally applies to the Act, because it
provides an exclusive federal cause of action without further
inquiry into Congressional intent. The Sixth Circuit recently
agreed. 77 Though this result seems a logical extension of the
Supreme Court's holding in Beneficial, ignoring Congressional
intent with regard to the Copyright Act not only undermines
Congress' explicit desire to preserve certain causes of action, but
disregards long established limits on federal jurisdiction and can
lead to incongruous results.
C. The Shortened Test for Complete Preemption Under the
CopyrightAct
If courts continue to agree with Briarpatch, and find that
complete preemption applies under the Copyright Act, they will no
longer need to explore Congressional intent, but merely apply
Briarpatch's more lenient test to determine whether ordinary
preemption applies. In other words, by finding that a claim
satisfies the subject matter and general scope prongs of the
ordinary preemption test, a court could justify removal simply
because the Copyright Act wholly displaces an area of law. A
more stringent standard should be required for complete
preemption to ensure that only narrow exceptions are carved out of
established jurisdictional principles.

71See

17 U.S.C. §§ 501-513 (2000).

Briarpatch, 373 F.3d at 305.
See Ritchie v. Williams, 395 F.3d 283, 286 (6th Cir. 2005) (approving
Briarpatch by noting that "the Second Circuit analyzed the Act in light of the
Anderson case ... and found that the doctrine of complete preemption clearly
applies").
76

77
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IV. PROBLEMS APPLYING BENEFICIAL TO THE COPYRIGHT ACT
Congress has broad authority to control the jurisdiction of the
lower federal courts."8 Accordingly, the existence of removal
jurisdiction in a particular case should turn on whether Congress
has granted it, and not simply whether Congress provided an
exclusive remedy. Under such a lax standard, many claims that
were previously subject to ordinary preemption-often because
Congress did provide an exclusive remedy-will consequently be
subject to complete preemption and removed to federal court,
rather than simply dismissed. This result disrupts the balance of
power between state and federal courts and undermines the "well
pleaded complaint" rule, "master of the complaint" doctrine, and
even Congressional intent.
Because complete preemption
represents a grave deviation from these well-settled principles, it
should be applied sparingly.
A. A Brief History of Complete Preemption
The concept of complete preemption was first conceived in
1968 in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735,79 which held that that a
cause of action arising under § 301 of the Labor and Management
Relations Act ("LMRA") was preempted and subject to removal.8"
Although the opinion in Avco did not specifically use the term
"complete preemption," its significance was brought to life in
Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust,81
which noted that "the pre-emptive force of § 301 is so powerful as
to displace entirely any state cause of action for violation of
contracts between an employer and a labor organization."82 The
court did not take the opportunity in either Avco or Franchise Tax
78

Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 233-34 (1922) (observing that,

aside from the Supreme Court, "Only the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is
derived directly from the Constitution. Every other court created by the general
government derives its jurisdiction wholly from the authority of Congress").
79 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
80 See Avco Corp., 390 U.S. at 560.
81 463 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1983).
" Id.at 23.
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Board to explain why the preempted claims were "exempt from
the strictures of the well-pleaded-complaint rule, nor did it explain
how such a state-law claim can plausibly be said to 'arise under'
federal law."83 Justice Scalia subsequently described Avco's
holding as "jurisdictional alchemy,''84 grounded in misplaced
reliance on the dicta of Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 5 which
held that "[a]ny state law applied [in a § 301 case] will be absorbed
as federal law and will not be an independent source of private
rights."86
Whether decided rightly or wrongly, these landmark cases laid
the framework for the anomalous doctrine of complete preemption.
However, nearly two decades passed before the Court decided to
extend the complete preemption doctrine, albeit reluctantly, to
actions arising under § 502 of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act ("ERISA").87 Although the holding in Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor8 provided little justification for
further extension of the doctrine, ERISA's unique legislative
history provided a strong nail upon which the Court could rest its
hat.89 Specifically, the legislative history is laden with evidence
that when drafting ERISA, Congress, aware of the Avco decision
and newly-recognized complete preemption doctrine, intended to
allow for removal of claims arising under ERISA, in the same
manner as claims that were deemed to arise under the Labor and
Management Relations Act.9"
83

See Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 14 (2003) (Scalia, J.,

dissenting).
84
id.

85
86

353 U.S. 448 (1957).
Beneficial, 539 U.S. at 14 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Textile Workers v.

Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957)).
87 See generally Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987) (holding
that Congress intended to allow removal of claims that fell within the scope of
§ 502 of ERISA).
88 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
89 ERISA was passed in 1974, two years before the Copyright Act of 1976.
90 "No more specific reference to the Avco rule can be expected and the rest of
the legislative history consistently sets out this clear intention to make
§ 502(a)(1)(B) suits brought by participants or beneficiaries federal questions for
the purposes of federal court jurisdiction in like manner as § 301 of the LMRA."
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First, the statutory text in § 502(a)9' not only provided an

express federal remedy for the plaintiffs' claims, but also included
a jurisdictional subsection9 2 with similar language to that at issue in
Avco, indicating that Congress wanted the two statutes construed in
the same way.9 3

Second, the legislative history unambiguously

described Congress' intent to treat ERISA actions "as arising under
the laws of the United States in similar fashion to those brought
under section 301 of the [LMRA] of 1947." 94
The court wrote:
In the absence of explicit directionfrom Congress .... Even with a
provision such as § 502(a)(1)(B) that lies at the heart of a statute with
the unique pre-emptive force of ERISA... we would be reluctant to
find that extraordinary pre-emptive power, such as has been found with
respect to 301 of the LMRA, that converts an ordinary state common
law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the wellpleaded complaint rule.95

When Metropolitan Life was decided, the Supreme Court was
clearly looking beyond the fact that ERISA provided an exclusive
federal remedy, for a more express indication of Congressional
intent, the "touchstone" of removal jurisdiction.96
B. So why the sudden change in Beneficial?
Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson,97 handed down in 2003,

purports to change the focus from whether Congress intended to
allow for removal, to whether Congress intended to provide the
Metro Life, 481 U.S. at 66 (citing Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41,
54-55 (1987)).
91 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2004).
92

§ 502(a)(1)(b).

93Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.
94 Beneficial Nat'l Bank

Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65 (1987).
v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (citing H.R. REP.
No. 93-1280, at 327 (1974) (Conf. Rep.)).
9'Metro. Life, 481 U.S. at 64-65 (emphasis added).
96 "Indeed, as we have noted, even an 'obvious' pre-emption [sic] defense
does not, in most cases, create removal jurisdiction. In this case, however,
Congress has clearly manifested an intent to make causes of action within the
scope of the civil enforcement provisions of § 502(a) removable to federal
court." Metro. Life, 481 U.S. at 66.
97 539 U.S. 1 (2003).
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exclusive federal remedy.98 One justification for this change is
grounded in the unique facts of the case. The National Bank Act,
("NBA") at issue in the case, was passed in 1864, eleven years
prior to the passage of the statute authorizing removal, thus predating federal question jurisdiction, the "well pleaded complaint"
rule, and the doctrine of complete preemption.99 Congress had no
reason to address issues, such as removal, that did not yet exist.
Therefore, Congressional intent to permit removal based on
complete preemption would have been impossible. Although the
facts of the case demanded a test that focused on whether Congress
intended to provide an exclusive federal remedy as opposed to
allow for removal, such a lenient standard should be confined to
those situations involving statutes passed prior to the removal
statute, and before the establishment of principles such as the "well
pleaded complaint" rule.
C. Congress did not intend for complete preemption under the
CopyrightAct
Since the inception of removal jurisdiction, the "well pleaded
complaint" rule and the complete preemption doctrine, Congress
has taken care to explicitly provide for removal under various
statutes-the Copyright Act is not one of them.00 When passing
ERISA in 1974, Congress referenced the rule of Avco and
indicated that claims coming within the scope of § 502 of ERISA
should be recharactized as federal claims and removed, just as had
been done with LMRA claims.'
Congress has also passed
statutes that explicitly provide for complete preemption. For
example, the Price-Anderson Act, originally passed in 1957, was
amended in 1988 to include a preemption provision0 2 that not only
98

See id.
at 9 (n.5).

99

Id.

100Neither doctrine existed with the National Bank Act, at issue in Beneficial,

was passed. Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S.1,9 (2003) (n.5).
'0' Metro. Life, 481 U.S. at 66.
102 See 42 U.S.C. 2010(n)(2) (2004) ("With respect to any public liability
action arising out of or resulting from a nuclear incident, the United States
district court... shall have original jurisdiction without regard to the citizenship
of any party or the amount in controversy. Upon motion ... any such action
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gives federal courts original jurisdiction over tort actions arising
out of nuclear accidents, but expressly provides for removal to
federal court when an action is brought in state court, even if the
complaint asserts only state-law claims." 3 Congress undoubtedly
recognizes the need to explicitly provide for removal.
Nevertheless, two years after ERISA's passage, when drafting the
Copyright Act of 1976, Congress, aptly familiar with the doctrine
of complete preemption, made no mention of the Avco decision nor
did it provide for removal. Therefore, it would be incongruous to
assume that every time Congress provides an exclusive remedy, it
also intends that claims falling within that statute be removed to
federal court, rather than simply dismissed.
Unless Congress desired to control the adjudication to such an
extent that it provided not only a federal defense, but intended to
allow for removal, complete preemption should not apply. There
is no such explicit language in the Copyright Act. To the contrary,
Congress expressly intended to preserve various state causes of
action.
Numerous courts previously relied on the Fourth Circuit's
findings in Rosciszewski, that the preemptive force of § 301(a)
along with the grant of exclusive federal court jurisdiction for
actions arising under the Copyright Act, demonstrated that
Congress intended to permit removal.'" However, in doing so,
pending in any State court (including any such action pending on August 20,
1988) or United States district court shall be removed or transferred to the
United States district court having venue under this subsection ... ").
103 See id.; see also El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 484
(1999) ("The Act not only gives a district court original jurisdiction over such a
claim . . . but provides for removal to a federal court as of right if a putative
Price-Anderson action is brought in a state court.").
104 See, e.g., Metrano v. Fox Broad., Co., Inc., 2000 WL 979664,
at 3 (C.D.
Cal.) ("Accordingly, state claims that are equivalent to federal copyright claims
are completely preempted by the Copyright Act."); Info. Handing Servs., Inc. v.
LRP Publ'ns, Inc., 2000 WL 433998, at 4 (E.D. Pa.) ("Finally, other courts that
have considered the issue have found the Copyright Act to be completely
preemptive."); Worth v. Universal Pictures, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 816, 821 (C.D.
Cal. 1997) ("Complete preemption has been found for claims brought under the
Copyright Act."); Dielsi v. Falk, 916 F. Supp. 985, 993 (C.D. Cal. 1996)
("Although there is no Ninth Circuit authority on point, a common law claim
preempted by federal copyright law is clearly completely preempted under these

N.C.J. L. & TECH.

[VOL. 7:205

courts undermine or completely ignore the language of Subsection
301(b)(3), which states:
Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the
common law or statutes of any State with respect to . ..activities
violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to any of the
exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by
section 106 ....

Certainly the rights to rely on one's contracts, be free from
misrepresentations, and be able to vindicate unlawful conversions
involve legal and equitable rights and remedies that are not
equivalent to those protected under the Copyright Act. The
legislative history further supports the theory that Congress did not
intend to preempt other types of state law claims. For instance, the
original language of § 301(b)(3) expressly states that rights not
preempted by section 301 include "rights against misappropriation
not equivalent to [any of the exclusive rights within the general
scope of copyright], breaches of contract, breaches of trust,
trespass, conversion... and deceptive trade practices... .""' This

non-exhaustive list of examples was "intended to illustrate rights
and remedies which are different in nature from the rights
comprised in a copyright and that may continue to be protected
under State common law or Statute."'' 6
Therefore, even if it is decided that complete preemption
applies under the Copyright Act, courts have a duty to apply the
"extra element" test in a more meaningful way that focuses on the
elements needed to prove the cause of action rather than the facts
pled to prove them." 7 By focusing on the facts used to prove a
claim, courts allow preemption simply because a plaintiff
theoretically could have brought a claim under the Copyright Act.
This approach, in turn, may leave the plaintiff without any cause of
action.
principles.") (emphasis in original); Wharton v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc.,
907 F. Supp. 144, 146 (D. Md. 1995) (following Rosciszewski); Patrick v.
Francis, 887 F. Supp. 481, 485 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) (following Rosciszewski).
'o' H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 132 (1976).
106 id.
107 Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d 655, 660 (4th Cir. 1993)
(upholding a district court decision that the Copyright Act did not preempt
plaintiffs trade secret claims).
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V. REVERSING THE TREND OF COMPLETE PREEMPTION
Unless courts take steps to reverse the trend of complete
preemption, individuals may find themselves reluctant to express
ideas that are not protected by copyright registration, and for good
reason. If that idea is misused, unless plaintiffs can pursue a claim
under the Copyright Act, they may have no claim at all. In
addition to the chilling effect complete preemption may have on
expression, it also threatens to undermine the "well pleaded
complaint" rule and the principle that the plaintiff is master of his
complaint.
In determining whether complete preemption applies to the
Copyright Act, courts should not disregard Congressional intent,
which forms the "touchstone" of federal court removal
jurisdiction." 8 As the Briarpatch court conceded, "[w]e had
understood the [complete preemption] doctrine to be restricted to
'the very narrow range of cases where Congress has clearly
manifested an intent to make specific action within a particular
area removable."" 9 Yet the court found that its own inquiry into
Congressional intent was unnecessary in light of the Supreme
Court's holding in Beneficial. This understanding nullifies the test
once used to differentiate claims subject to ordinary preemption
from the more narrow class subject to complete preemption.
Under this view, by simply determining that ordinary preemption
applies to the Copyright Act,110 which did not allow removal,
courts will now automatically be permitted to remove the claim.1 1'

108

See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66 (1987).

109 Briarpatch Ltd., L.P. v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 304 (2nd Cir.

2004).
110
Ordinary preemption undisputedly does apply to the Copyright Act as long
as a claim satisfies the subject matter and general scope prong (extra-element
test).
111
Previously, once satisfied that preemption applied under the Copyright
Act, courts had to determine whether Congress intended to apply complete
preemption to the Copyright Act. Although the Fourth Circuit thought that
complete preemption did apply, this issue was still debatable. Briarpatch, 373
F.3d at 304.
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A more stringent standard should be required for finding
complete preemption to ensure that only narrow exceptions are
carved out of established principles such as the "well pleaded
complaint" rule, and preserving the balance of power between the
state and federal courts. Unless Congress desired to control the
adjudication to such an extent that it provided not only a federal
defense, but intended to allow for removal, complete preemption
should not apply. There is no such explicit language in the
Copyright Act. To the contrary, Congress expressly intended to
preserve various state causes of action.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The rapid expansion of the complete preemption doctrine
threatens to rip from the moorings our longstanding values of
federalism, including such basic notions as the "well pleaded
complaint rule" and the principle that the plaintiff is "master of his
complaint." In so far as complete preemption applies to the
Copyright Act, almost any time a claim involves creative
expression fixed in a tangible medium, it will be subject to
complete preemption under the Copyright Act. In light of the
Supreme Court's holding in Beneficial,112 courts are no longer
required to determine that Congress intended to permit removal.
In addition, the "extra element" test, once an effective limit on
complete preemption, is now applied in a way that focuses on the
facts used to plead a claim, rather than the elements needed to
prove a claim. Under this more rigorous test, almost any state or
common law claim could arguably be touted as a mere pretense for
a copyright claim. An increasing number of state law claims are
being pushed into federal courts against the plaintiffs will,
occasionally leaving the plaintiff without any remedy at all.
In order to preserve our longstanding balance of power
between state and federal court systems, courts should not ignore
Congressional intent, which explicitly favors continuing to allow a
variety of state law claims to be litigated in state courts. In
addition, courts should strive to apply the "extra element" test as it
112

539 U.S. 1 (2003).

FALL

2005]

Copyright & Complete Preemption

231

was intended-by focusing on whether the state or common law
claim included an element that falls outside of the exclusive rights
protected under the Copyright Act. In this way, a plaintiff will be
free to frame claims as he chooses, courts will not unjustifiably
deprive plaintiffs of a remedy under the law, and the balance of
power between state and federal courts will be preserved.

232
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